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Evidence
By ROBERT G. LAWSON*
I. EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES
Almost as often as not the government's case in criminal
litigation will contain evidence indicating that the accused
committed some offense other than the one for which he is
being tried. Consequently a set of rules to control the use of
evidence of "other crimes" has evolved. In most jurisdictions
it consists of a single rule that prohibits the use of such evi-
dence against a defendant along with a group of exceptions that
virtually engulfs the prohibition against admissibility. Ken-
tucky law is so structured. As all lawyers who engage in crimi-
nal litigation in this state know, evidence of "other crimes"
may be introduced by the government to prove motive, intent,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, common
scheme, and so on and so forth. Since the last survey of evi-
dence law, the Kentucky Supreme Court has decided two cases
of significance to this doctrine.
A. Other Crimes to Provide Perspective
The first is Ware v. Commonwealth,' a case in which the
evidence doctrine under discussion became involved in the is-
sues directly. The litigation started when the defendant was
charged with one count of rape against each of two young
women. The charges against this defendant were consolidated
with charges of rape against two other offenders. All four alle-
gations originated from a criminal episode that commenced
late one Saturday evening, continued through the night, and
terminated when the women escaped the following morning.
Evidence introduced by the state at the consolidated trial indi-
cated that the three defendants took turns throughout the
night having non-consensual intercourse with three young
women, two of whom were named in the indictments as vic-
tims. The evidence against Ware indicated that he had com-
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.S. 1960, Berea College; J.D. 1963,
University of Kentucky.
537 S.W.2d 174 (Ky. 1976).
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mitted several acts of rape against one of the named victims
during the period of time in question.
In appealing his conviction, Ware made two arguments
that involved the law under discussion. He argued that error
was committed because of the consolidation of his case with the
cases involving the other two defendants; particularly, he as-
serted that the jury was permitted to hear to his prejudice
evidence about crimes committed by the other defendants. He
made this argument despite the fact that the trial judge at-
tempted carefully to keep the testimony confined in its appli-
cation to the respective defendants. As the Supreme Court
said, "[M]ore than once he instructed the jury not to consider
the acts of any one of the defendants as substantive evidence
against the others.'" Ware's second argument was that prejudi-
cial error was committed because the trial court failed to ad-
monish the jury to limit its use of evidence that tended to prove
that he had engaged in acts of forcible intercourse that were not
the subject of charges. For this argument Ware relied on cases
indicating that such "other acts" would have to be used for
corroboration, to prove lustful disposition, or some other lim-
ited purpose.' The Supreme Court rejected both arguments.
Before Ware a factual situation such as existed in that case
(i.e., one involving multiple criminal acts against a single vic-
tim, followed by an indictment for only one offense) would have
triggered an application of the evidence doctrine under discus-
sion. The case of Rigsby v. Commonwealth contains a concise
statement of the manner in which the evidence issue would
have been approached:
Evidence of acts prior and subsequent to the offense charged
in the indictment is admissible as tending to establish the
2 Id. at 177.
The defendant's precise argument was as follows:
It was the theory of defense counsel .. that whereas each defendant
was accused of only one rape of each girl but the evidence covered several
rapes of each, the Commonwealth was required to elect which act was to be
the basis for the prosecution, and that in the absence of such an election it
would be presumed to be the first act proved.
... Hence, it is said, testimony relating to subsequent acts of a similar
nature must be limited to corroborative purposes, as tending to show design
or a lustful disposition.
Id. at 178.
4 495 S.W.2d 795 (Ky. 1973).
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accused's singular purpose and intent to assault the victim
sexually . . . . Testimony as to forced acts of oral sodomy
which took place before and after an alleged rape is admissi-
ble as res gestae of the offense concerning facts and circum-
stances surrounding the commission of the act . . . . The
lustful inclination of the accused may also be shown in this
way. The testimony was followed by an admonition to con-
sider it only as showing design, disposition or intent, if in fact
it did so.'
Under these principles, despite the general rule against admis-
sibility of "other crimes" evidence, the testimony about Ware's
other acts of rape upon the named victims would have been
admissible for the limited purpose of showing design, disposi-
tion, lustful inclination, or intent. However, an instruction to
the jury to limit the use of the evidence would have been neces-
sary. Since no such instruction was given in Ware's case, his
second argument clearly was supported by precedent.
In rejecting Ware's argument, the Supreme Court over-
ruled some earlier decisions and altered the law to the extent
revealed in the following statement:
In such a case [i.e., one involving multiple acts against
a single victim over a fixed period of time] technicality reigns
over substance when the prosecution must stand or fall on the
necessity of selecting and proving that one of those acts was
committed at a certain time. It makes better sense for the
jury to be allowed to base its verdict on a finding of whether
the crime in question was committed at any time during the
period specified in the indictment and covered by the testi-
mony of the prosecuting witness, thus eliminating the fatuous
song and dance in which the jury is permitted to hear about
all of the different criminal acts but is admonished (uselessly,
we suggest) not to consider them as "substantive" evidence
against the defendant, but only insofar as they may tend to
show motive or design, or a lustful disposition on his part, or
the relationship of the parties, or to corroborate the witness's
testimony with respect to the offense for which the defendant
is being tried. If the state seeks but one conviction out of a
Id. at 799. In an earlier case involving the type of factual situation under discus-
sion, the Court of Appeals had ruled that evidence of the other offenses could be




series of similar criminal acts against the same victim, all of
the evidence of all of the acts might as well be treated as and
called substantive evidence. That is how the jury will look at
it anyway.'
The content of this statement relates of course to the "other
crimes" of the defendant Ware. But it was extended in its
application to cover "other crimes" committed by his co-
defendants during the criminal episode from which the charges
arose. More specifically, the Supreme Court ruled that an ad-
monition to the jury "not to consider the acts of any one of the
defendants as substantive evidence against the others" is un-
necessary in a situation such as existed in this case.
7
The changes in evidence law resulting from this decision
are most certainly lacking in monumental importance. As a
matter of practical effect, the testimonial information admissi-
ble in a case like Ware is the same as it has previously been.
Only the manner of its use is different. Nevertheless, it should
be recognized that the doctrinal alteration made by the deci-
sion is significant, for it serves to eliminate an artificial ritual
that probably confused the decision makers. In addition, it
should be recognized that Ware may take on some unexpected
significance because of the simple explanation given by the
Supreme Court for admitting the evidence of Ware's other
crimes in the first place:
In order to determine exactly what did or did not happen
at any particular stage in the sequence it was necessary that
the jury see the entire picture. In short, evidence that pro-
vides necessary perspective is competent. That it may inci-
dentally involve other criminal acts does not perforce render
it inadmissible.'
For many years the "other crimes" doctrine of Kentucky has
included a rule that allows for the introduction of evidence that
reveals uncharged crimes which are so interwoven and con-
nected with the crime charged that introduction of the evi-
dence is unavoidable if the prosecution is to be given necessary
6 537 S.W.2d at 178-79 (footnote omitted).
7 Id. at 179.
8 Id. (emphasis added).
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latitude to prove its case.' The statement in Ware that permits
the introduction of evidence that provides "necessary perspec-
tive" should serve well as a corollary to this long-standing rule,
if courts are cautious with its application and give appropriate
emphasis to the requirement of necessity.
B. Other Crimes Evidence and Collateral Estoppel
Occasionally evidence rendered admissible by the doctrine
discussed above will consist of indisputable documentary proof
of a prior criminal conviction; most of the time, however, the
evidence will not be nearly so probative of a defendant's guilt
of the other crime. As occurred in Ware, one or more witnesses
will simply present testimony that is supportive of a conclusion
that the accused committed the other offense. Of course, this
testimony-like all other-might be false or otherwise erro-
neous, meaning that there exists a possibility that the accused
is actually innocent of the other crime. Reasoning that this
factor bears on weight and not on admissibility, courts have
refused to treat the possibility of innocence as a sufficient rea-
son to shield a defendant from the use of this kind of informa-
tion. Suppose, however, that the possibility of innocence of the
other crime has been enhanced by the fact that the defendant
was formally charged with the other crime, tried in a prior trial,
and acquitted of the charge. Should admissibility be affected
by this change of circumstances? This question was presented
to the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Commonwealth v.
Hille brand. 1,
Hillebrand was an official in the City of Louisville Depart-
ment of Building and Housing Inspection. He was indicted for
accepting a bribe from a man named Sutherland. Indicted
along with him as an accessory before the fact was a friend by
the name of Powers. In the trial of this case the prosecution
attempted to introduce evidence which tended to show that
Hillebrand and Powers, in dealings with a man named Dunn,
had earlier engaged in conduct similar to that involved in the
I See, e.g., Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 503 S.W.2d 485 (Ky. 1972); Hawkins v.
Commonwealth, 481 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1972); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 474 S.W.2d
107 (Ky. 1971).
10 536 S.W.2d 451 (Ky. 1976).
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charge. Ordinarily the evidence would have been admissible
under the "other crimes" rules to show a common scheme or
pattern of conduct. However, the situation was not ordinary,
since Hillebrand and Powers had earlier been tried for bribery
of Dunn and acquitted. In the proceeding involving the alleged
bribe of Sutherland, the two defendants argued that any use
of evidence about the conduct involved in their earlier acquit-
tal would constitute a violation of their rights under the double
jeopardy clause. Persuaded by this argument, the trial court
excluded the prosecution's testimony about the defendants'
activities with Dunn; in the absence of this evidence the de-
fendants received a second acquittal. The Commonwealth
appealed to the Supreme Court in order to obtain a certifica-
tion of law on the admissibility of such evidence.
The issue on this appeal revolved around a decision of the
United States Supreme Court concerning the scope of the dou-
ble jeopardy clause. This case, Ashe v. Swenson," started with
an allegation that the defendant, along with several others,
robbed the participants in a poker game. Ashe was tried ini-
tially for robbery of only one of the participants. The sole issue
in this trial was one of identification. The state's evidence was
weak, and Ashe was acquitted of the charge. Subsequently, the
government proceeded against him for robbery of another of
the participants, and brought him to trial for a second time.
In this second proceeding, the government's witnesses were
about the same, "though . . . their testimony was substan-
tially stronger on the issue of [Ashe's] identity."' 2 In addition,
the government strengthened its case in the second trial "by
declining to call one of the participants in the poker game
whose identification testimony at the first trial had been con-
spicuously negative."' 3 On the second try the defendant was
convicted; ultimately he got his case to the Supreme Court of
the United States, and presented to that body the question of
whether his conviction was violative of the double jeopardy
prohibition.
In confronting this issue the Court made an important
assumption about the criminal transaction in question,
3 97 U.S. 436 (1970).




namely, that it consisted not of a single robbery of a poker
game but rather multiple robberies through an "act" of robbing
a poker game. Presumably, the Court would have considered
it appropriate for Ashe to have been charged in a single pro-
ceeding with several robberies (one for each participant in the
game) and to have received a separate penalty for each. Fur-
thermore, in the jurisdiction in which Ashe was charged there
existed no rule requiring joinder by the state of separate offen-
ses arising from a single transaction. Under such circumstances
the Ashe case was reduced to the following issue: What is there
to prevent the government from proceeding against the de-
fendant successively for each of the robbery offenses? Accord-
ing to the Supreme Court, it is the "principle that bars reliti-
gation between the same parties of issues actually determined
at a previous trial." 4
This principle, known as collateral estoppel, contemplates
that there exist between two parties at least two legal contro-
versies-perhaps more commonly labeled as "causes of ac-
tion," "claims for relief," or "cases"-each of which has an
issue of fact or law in common with the other. It further con-
templates that if the two controversies are litigated in succes-
sive actions, there shall be issue preclusion against one of the
parties in the second action if the common issue is found to
have been previously "(1) litigated by the parties; (2) deter-
mined by the tribunal; and (3) necessarily so determined." 5
The Supreme Court incorporated this principle into the double
jeopardy clause in Ashe and applied it to the facts described
above. It concluded that in the first trial the parties fully liti-
gated the identification issue, that the issue was determined
against the state, and that the determination was essential to
the jury's verdict of acquittal. Finally, concluding that the
same identification issue was involved in the second trial, the
Court ruled that the government violated Ashe's constitutional
rights by proceeding against him in the second case.
Without seeming either naive or uninformed, it is possible
to wonder what this ruling has to do with the admissibility of
evidence. The efforts of a state to take a single, inseparable
criminal transaction and carve from it several offenses and
" Id. at 442.
F. JAMEs, CWM PROCEDURE 576 (1965).
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several prosecutions created the problem presented in Ashe.
The case involved neither directly nor indirectly matters con-
nected with the admissibility of evidence. Yet, the trial judge
assigned to try the Hillebrand case concluded that the ruling
in Ashe foreclosed any possibility of using in a second trial
evidence about conduct which had been the subject of an ac-
quittal in a prior trial. He did so apparently in reliance on a
decision by a federal court of appeals in Wingate v.
Wainwright.'6 Consequently, most of the discussion in
Hillebrand focused on the validity of this federal decision.
Wingate started with a charge against the defendant-by
the state of Florida for robbing a small store. In proving its
case, the government called witnesses to testify about two inde-
pendent robberies allegedly committed by Wingate prior to the
one involved in the trial. Ordinarily, under Florida law the
evidence would have been admissible to show a common
scheme or plan similar to the one involved in the robbery under
trial. The problem with admissibility was identical to that
which existed in Hillebrand; the defendant had been pre-
viously tried for the two robberies and acquitted of both. The
state courts of Florida resolved the problem in favor of admit-
ting the evidence despite the acquittals, and the defendant
proceeded through habeas corpus to challenge that resolution
in federal court. He asserted before the federal tribunals that
collateral estoppel barred the state from introducing evidence
containing the implication that the prior robberies had been
committed. The State of Florida countered with the argument
that collateral estoppel does not preclude relitigation of issues
(including even those settled by an earlier acquittal) unless a
defendant is being prosecuted for an offense for which he has
been earlier acquitted or some other offense arising from the
same criminal transaction. The federal court of appeals, rely-
ing on Ashe v. Swenson,1 7 adopted the defendant's position. It
reasoned that an introduction of evidence about prior conduct
for which a defendant has been acquitted serves to force him
"to defend against charges or factual allegations which he over-
came in the earlier trial.""8
1$ 464 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1972).
17 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
11 464 F.2d at 214.
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The Supreme Court of Kentucky was strongly urged by
defendant's counsel in Hillebrand to accept the position
adopted in Wingate, which was described by the Kentucky
Court to be as follows: "[Wihere an accused has been acquit-
ted of a charge of crime, no evidence at all relating to that
crime can be admitted on a subsequent trial for another of-
fense." 9 Instead of accepting this invitation of Hillebrand's
counsel, the Supreme Court repudiated with strong language
the Wingate case and declared that decision to have been erro-
neous on several grounds. The Court then expressed its own
viewpoint about the application of collateral estoppel to the
situation under discussion:
As we understand the holding in Ashe v. Swenson, it is
that if an issue of fact has been determined against the prose-
cution in the trial of an offense, the prosecution cannot again
litigate that issue of fact upon a later trial of the same de-
fendant for another offense.
20
Having done this the Court then proceeded to apply Ashe to
the factual situation presented in Hillebrand. Its analysis of
the first case involving Hillebrand and Powers led to the con-
clusion that only one issue of fact had been decided against the
state, which of course accounted for the acquittal. The Court
said that all testimony bearing on that particular issue should
have been excluded by the trial judge in the second proceeding
against the two defendants. However, according to the Court,
all other testimony connected with the conduct involved in the
first proceeding should have been admitted against the de-
fendants in the second trial because of its relevancy to the
second charge.
In this ruling and in the Court's pronouncements about
Ashe there is no lack of clarity. Yet the Court's response in
Hillebrand to the broader issue under consideration (i.e., the
application of collateral estoppel to the doctrine of "other
crimes" evidence) leaves some questions at least partially un-
answered. The best way to reveal these questions is by use of a
hypothetical case that presents the Hillebrand issue in a
' 536 S.W.2d at 453.
20 Id. (emphasis in original).




The hypothetical case involves a charge of forcible rape
that arises from a transaction with some rather unusual fea-
tures. Suppose that without arousing fear or suspicion, an indi-
vidual [hereinafter called the defendant] manages to get a
young woman into his automobile. He then travels with her to
various places, during which time several escape possibilities
would have been available to an "abducted" individual. After
a while the defendant drives to a secluded place, stops the
vehicle, and causes the woman by threat to remove her lower
garments. By the woman's subsequent account, she is then
forced to submit to intercourse and various other sexual acts.
Thereafter the defendant returns the young woman to a safe
place and, as she departs his company, he suggests that per-
haps she should obtain his license number. Promptly the de-
fendant goes to police authorities and reports a consensual act
of intercourse with the young woman. He tells the police that
he fears a charge of rape because of an argument with the
woman, ostensibly resulting from a derogatory statement
which he made about the sexual experience.
A report of the incident is indeed made to the police by the
young woman; a trial of the defendant for rape is the end result.
Naturally the defense is consent. Included in the government's
evidence is testimony from two other women who would testify,
if permitted, that the defendant raped them under circumstan-
ces strikingly similar to those involved in the charge. Each of
the other "alleged" episodes, according to the proposed testi-
mony, started with amiable conversation, and included a car
ride with several escape possibilities, a subsequent threat
which caused the woman to remove her lower garments, sexual
acts like those involved in the principal case, a return of the
woman to a place of safety, and in one instance a suggestion
that the woman should go to the police. Only one problem
exists with respect to admissibility of the testimony. Formal
rape charges have earlier been leveled against the defendant by
each of the witnesses, and, on the basis of "consent" defenses,
he has been acquitted of each charge. The resolution of this
hypothetical case under the reasoning of Wingate v.
Wainwright 2would be quite simple. The testimony in question
-" 464 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1972).
[Vol. 66
KENTUCKY LAW SURVEY
(with its obvious implication that the reported offenses oc-
curred despite the acquittals) would force the defendant "to
defend again against charges or factual allegations which he
overcame in the earlier trial." But how would the case be
resolved under the reasoning of Commonwealth v.
Hillebrand?'A
Before attempting to answer this question it should be
helpful to describe (by use of this hypothetical) a possible in-
terpretation of Ashe v. Swenson2 that was apparently not pre-
sented to the Kentucky Supreme Court for consideration. This
interpretation leads to a conclusion about the application of
collateral estoppel to "other crimes" evidence that is directly
opposite the conclusion reached in Wingate. It is as follows:
The doctrine of collateral estoppel, when properly defined, con-
templates that there exists between two parties two or more
legal controversies with a common issue of fact; and the doc-
trine contemplates that if this common issue is fully litigated
and decided in an action involving one of the controversies, it
may not be relitigated in an action involving the other. When
applied to the hypothetical case, these propositions lead to a
conclusion that the three controversies between the accused
and the government (i.e., the three alleged rapes and their
denials) have no common issues of fact. At least no one could
reasonably assert that issues of consent in multiple rape cases
with different victims are "common issues" in the same sense
that "identification" was a common issue of fact in the Ashe
controversies. Thus, a determination against the state on one
of the consent issues (through an acquittal) should not trigger
application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel in a proceed-
ing involving the other issue; evidence about the prior conduct
would be admissible in the second proceeding, despite the ac-
quittal, if the rules of evidence law otherwise qualify it for
admissibility.
The federal court of appeals that decided Wingate clearly
rejected this interpretation of Ashe. The Supreme Court of
Kentucky, as stated above, was strongly critical of the Wingate
decision; however, there are two reasonably concrete indica-
1 Id. at 214.
24 536 S.W.2d 451 (Ky. 1976).
397 U.S. 436 (1970).
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tions that the Court did not reject the Wingate interpretation
of Ashe in favor of the one described in the preceding para-
graph. First, after setting forth the Wingate ruling (i.e., that
"no evidence at all relating to [the prior offense] can be ad-
mitted on a subsequent trial for another offense"),2 the Ken-
tucky Court made the following statement in reference to its
understanding of Ashe:. "Ashe v. Swenson plainly says that the
only evidence that is precluded is evidence of issues of fact
which necessarily were determined against the prosecution on
the prior trial." If taken literally, the position represented by
this statement is obviously different only in degree and not in
kind from the one adopted in the Wingate case. The second,
virtually conclusive indication that Hillebrand merely adopts
a modified version of the Wingate interpretation of Ashe is the
manner in which the Kentucky Court resolved the factual
problem before it. On the basis of Ashe the Court decided that
the prosecution should not have been permitted to introduce
evidence connected in any fashion with the "finding" that re-
sulted in the prior acquittal, notwithstanding the fact that this
"finding" was not in any way at issue in the subsequent pro-
ceeding against Hillebrand and Powers. In other words, the
Court's ruling was compatible in a literal sense with its state-
ment about the Ashe case-an acquittal serves to preclude
"evidence of issues of fact which necessarily were determined
against the prosecution on the prior trial. '28
How the Supreme Court might apply Hillebrand to a fac-
tual pattern like that of the hypothetical is not absolutely cer-
tain, although the two "indicators" described above would
seem to require exclusion of the "other crimes" evidence. A
report of the two prior incidents to the jury in the third trial
would be meaningless without express testimony (or at least an
implication) that the incidents occurred without consent of the
women. In the earlier trials the issues of consent with respect
to the prior incidents were determined against the government.
Under these circumstances the reasoning of Wingate and
Hillebrand would seem to merge and call for the same result.
Whether Ashe v. Swenson29 was intended to have this kind
536 S.W.2d at 453.
Id. at 454 (emphasis in original).
'Id.
397 U.S. 436 (1970).
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of application is a question that is far too complex for consider-
ation in this writing. It is sufficient in this discussion merely
to point out that some courts which have confronted the ques-
tion have given a negative answer." As a matter of fact, the
court that decided the case from which the hypothetical was
extracted ruled that the Double Jeopardy Clause could not be
used to bar admissibility of the "other crimes" evidence in-
volved in that litigation.
3 '
I. HEARSAY
A. Admissibility of Medical Records
In this jurisdiction medical records are admitted into evi-
dence under the "regular business entries" exception to the
hearsay rule. At one time, records otherwise admissible under
this exception could not be introduced unless the person who
possessed the information represented by the record was shown
to be unavailable as a witness.12 Through the years this require-
ment changed in character to one that required only a showing
of "practical inconvenience" in the production of witnesses.
The altered requirement was applied as follows to medical re-
cords in a 1948 case, Whittaker v. Thornberry:33 "We conclude
that an authenticated hospital chart is admissible in evidence
where the party offering it shows the necessity of admitting the
record without requiring the person or several persons who
made it, or caused it to be made, to testify. 3 4 The necessity
requirement mentioned in this case could be satisfied by show-
ing that the inconvenience of producing witnesses outweighed
the value of forcing them to appear in person. 35
See, e.g., United States v. Addington, 471 F.2d 560 (10th Cir. 1973); People v.
Butler, 334 N.E.2d 448 (Ill. App. 1975); State v. Schlue, 323 A.2d 549 (N.J. 1974); State
v. Smith, 532 P.2d 9 (Ore. 1975).
31 People v. Oliphant, 217 N.W.2d 141 (Mich. App. 1974).
32 See Gus Dattilo Fruit Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 37 S.W.2d 856 (Ky.
1931); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Daniels, 91 S.W. 691 (Ky. 1906).
- 209 S.W.2d 498 (Ky. 1948).
' Id. at 501.
" The Whittaker opinion made this clear through its quotation with approval of
a statement from Wigmore's treatise:
Following his reasoning for the admissibility of this character of evi-
dence, Wigmore ... expresses the conclusion that there is no objection to
receiving such entries or transactions "provided the practical inconvenience
1978]
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The recent case of Buckler v. Commonwealth" provided
the Supreme Court with an opportunity to adjust the manner
in which this hearsay exception applies to the evidentiary use
of medical records. The defendant in this case killed her two-
month-old child, an act which resulted in her arrest and
prompt confinement in a state hospital for purposes of psychi-
atric observation. In support of a defense of insanity, the de-
fendant offered into evidence at the trial of the case medical
records which had been compiled during her confinement in
the hospital. The offer of proof was made in the absence of
any attempt by the defense to obtain the presence at trial of
the physicians who made the records. The trial judge ruled the
evidence inadmissible under the hearsay rule because of this
failure. After deciding that reversible error was committed with
this ruling, the Supreme Court described the manner in which
medical records must be treated under the hearsay rule:
[Tihe necessity requirement for the introduction of this type
of hearsay evidence is satisfied by the very nature of the
evidence sought to be introduced. We therefore feel it serves
no useful purpose to require any further showing of the ne-
cessity of admitting the medical records, as we indicated in
Payne v. Commonwealth. . .when we stated simply, "Our
rule is that records of patients at a hospital, organized on the
usual modern plan may be produced in evidence by the cus-
todian of the records." To the extent the holding in Whittaker
v. Thornberry, supra, requires such further showing of neces-
sity, it is hereby overruled . - . . We therefore conclude that
hospital records . . . are admissible into evidence, either on
identification of the original by the custodian of the records,
or on offer of a certified or sworn copy.
37
B. Opinion Testimony Based on Hearsay
In this same case the Supreme Court was provided an
opportunity to clarify another evidence rule involving the use
of hearsay. To support her defense of insanity, Buckler called
an expert witness who proposed to testify that the defendant
of producing on the stand the numerous other persons thus concerned would
in a particular case outweigh the probable utility of doing so."
Id. at 500.




was insane at the time of the homicidal act. The trial judge
ruled the testimony inadmissible because the opinion of the
expert was based in part on hearsay, specifically the excluded
medical records described in the preceding section. The issue
framed by this ruling (i.e., whether expert opinion that is de-
rived in part from hearsay evidence is admissible) has been
confronted on several occasions by the high courts of this state.
The decisions preceding Buckler contain at least a degree of
inconsistency.
In some cases expert witnesses have clearly been permitted
to rely on a limited type of hearsay in formulating and testify-
ing to opinions. For example, in one land condemnation case,
38
an expert was allowed to express an opinion as to the .market
value of land on the basis of hearsay evidence concerning the
sale prices for comparable property. And, in an automobile
accident case,39 an expert was allowed to rely on published
"skidmark-speed" tables in formulating and presenting an
opinion as to the speed of a vehicle at the time of a collision.
In cases involving opinion testimony from medical experts,
however, the decisions have been against admissibility.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Kazee 0 is illustrative. A physi-
cian testified at the trial of this case that his patient had suf-
fered from a venereal disease; his opinion in this regard was
based in part on a test conducted by another physician or per-
haps by a technician. The Court of Appeals, declaring this
testimony incompetent, ruled that a medical expert could not
be permitted to testify on the basis of information provided
him by a third person.
In Buckler the Supreme Court overruled Kazee and like
cases, and established the following standard by which to mea-
sure the admissibility of opinion testimony that is based in part
on hearsay evidence:
[W]e adopt as an exception to the hearsay rule in Ken-
tucky that an expert may properly express an opinion based
upon information supplied by third parties which is not in
evidence, but upon which the expert customarily relies in the
practice of his profession. Our previous opinions to the con-
Stewart v. Department of Highways, 337 S.W.2d 880 (Ky. 1960).
3, Ryan v. Payne, 446 S.W.2d 273 (Ky. 1969).
10 79 S.W.2d 208 (Ky. 1934).
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trary are hereby overruled. We emphasize that the type of
information which can be utilized by the expert in forming
his opinion would be only that produced by qualified person-
nel and on which the expert would customarily rely in the
day-to-day decisions attendant to his profession. Such a limi-
tation, we feel, guarantees a relatively high degree of reliabil-
ity and frees the expert to use for his testimony the tools on
which he normally relies in making a diagnosis. 1
III. IMPEACHMENT BY FELONY CONVICTION
Since their adoption in 1975, and even prior to that, the
Federal Rules of Evidence have exerted a substantial influence
on the development of Kentucky evidence law. With great fre-
quency these rules are presented by litigants as a "standard"
by which to consider evidence issues; and, with nearly equal
frequency, the Supreme Court and the court of appeals refer to
the-rules in resolving evidence questions that appear on appeal.
This influence seems to have been fairly pervasive, with one
highly notable and important exception. With respect to the
impeachment of witnesses by use of felony convictions, Ken-
tucky courts have rejected virtually every principle contained
in the federal impeachment provision. This pattern continued
during the last year with two decisions that deserve mention
in this survey.
A. "Finality" of a Conviction
In Commonwealth v. Duvall42 the prosecution attempted
to prove for purposes of impeachment that the defendant had
been convicted of a prior felony offense. At the time of this
effort the prior conviction in question had been affirmed by the
Supreme Court; however, there was pending in the case a peti-
tion for rehearing. (Eventually the petition was denied, but the
mandate affirming the conviction was not issued until after the
trial in Duvall.) The trial court rejected the prosecution's offer
of evidence on the basis of an old case in which the Court of
Appeals had ruled that a judgment of conviction is not final
(and thus not admissible for impeachment purposes) until the
1' 541 S.W.2d at 940.
12 No. 76-688 (Ky. Mar. 11, 1977)(per curiam).
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mandate is issued.43 Following an acquittal of the defendant,
the Commonwealth appealed to the Supreme Court in an at-
tempt to obtain an alteration of this old rule. On appeal the
Commonwealth urged the Court to adopt a provision from the
federal rules.
Under the federal provision the pendency of an appeal
does not prevent a litigant from introducing a criminal convic-
tion for purposes of impeachment.44 The justification for this
position was described by the drafters of the federal rules as
follows: "The presumption of correctness which ought to at-
tend judicial proceedings supports the position that pendency
of an appeal does not preclude use of a conviction for impeach-
ment. . . .The pendency of an appeal is, however, a qualify-
ing circumstance properly considerable."4 The Supreme Court
of Kentucky considered this rule and its underlying rationale,
and rejected both for the following reason: "We think. . that
until the litigation is ended and the conviction has survived the
appeal it should not be admissible. Until then the defendant's
day in court is not over."4
B. "Remoteness" of Prior Conviction
At the trial of Hardin v. Commonwealth" the prosecution
was permitted over objection to introduce into evidence, for the
purpose of impeaching the defense's only witness, a fifteen-
year-old felony conviction. Of course the rationale for admit-
ting prior convictions for impeachment purposes is that they
tend to prove a moral disposition in the witness as he exists at
the time of trial. Theorizing that this rationale did not fit his
witness very well, and no doubt influenced by a provision con-
tained in the federal rules,48 the defendant argued on appeal in
Hardin that the conviction in question was too remote for ad-
missibility.
The federal rule that influenced the defendant contains an
' Foure v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W. 958 (Ky. 1926).
' FED. R. Evm. 609(e).
" Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District
Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 301 (1969).
Commonwealth v. Duvall, No. 76-688 (Ky. Mar. 11, 1977)(per curiam).
' No. CA-336-MR (Ky. App. May 13, 1977).
"See FED. R. Evm. 609(b).
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arbitrary limitation on the admissibility of criminal convic-
tions that have occurred in the distant past. If a conviction is
more than ten years old, it may not be used in federal trials for
purposes of impeachment unless the trial court determines, in
the interest of justice, "that the probative value of the convic-
tion supported by specific facts and circumstances substan-
tially outweighs its prejudicial effect." 9 In considering Har-
din's appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals refused to adopt
a rule like the federal provision. Instead, it decided that
"remote" convictions should be treated as follows:
Cotton v. Commonwealth ...places upon the trial
judge the primary responsibility to weigh "the interest of
society in the prosecution of criminal defendants to provide
the trial jury with relevant evidence of the witness' untrust-
worthiness to be believed against the possible prejudice to
the witness." Remoteness of the prior conviction does consti-
tute a factor to be considered in the balance; however a set
number of years for remoteness cannot be arbitrarily made.
The inquiry seeks to discover the relevancy and prejudicial
impact of the conviction, but this can only be accomplished
on a case by case basis . . . .The length of time since the
conviction . . . only goes to its effectiveness as an impeach-
ment not its admissibility.',
Applying this principle to the factual situation before it, the
court of appeals ruled that the fifteen-year-old conviction in
question was properly introduced to impeach the defendant's
witness.
With respect to the factor of "remoteness," it should be
asked: Is there any real difference in substance between the
federal rule and the one adopted in Hardin? Each of the two
places discretion in the hands of the trial court to admit or
exclude such evidence; and each clearly indicates that remote-
ness is an important factor for consideration. Each of the rules
requires that the objective of the judge, in exercising his discre-
tion, be to eliminate the possibility of undue prejudice. It is
possible, therefore, that the only difference in the two rules is
in the manner in which they are stated. If future developments
should confirm the validity of this conclusion, they will simul-
' Id. (emphasis added).
Hardin v. Commonwealth, No. CA-336-MR (Ky. App. May 13, 1977).
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taneously reveal a change in the general tone of the Kentucky
rule, which at the present time seems clearly to favor admissi-
bility.
The federal provision, despite the similarities described
above, has a decidedly more exclusionary tone and character
about it than does the Kentucky rule. A remote conviction is
not admissible in federal cases unless the judge determines on
the basis of specific facts and circumstances that the probative
value of the conviction substantially outweighs its prejudicial
effect. The history involved in the adoption of this rule removes
all doubt that it was intended to have an exclusionary tenor.
In its initial form the federal provision on "remoteness" con-
tained no discretionary power to authorize the use of a convic-
tion more than ten years old.' The discretionary provision was
added by Congress, but not for the purpose of altering drasti-
cally the character of the rule. The Senate Committee on the
Judiciary made this fact undeniably clear in its Report on the
Rules:
Although convictions over ten years old generally do not
have much probative value, there may be exceptional cir-
cumstances under which the conviction substantially bears
on the credibility of the witness. Rather than exclude all
convictions over 10 years old, the committee adopted an
amendment in the form of a final clause to the section grant-
ing the court discretion to admit convictions over 10 years
old, but only upon a determination by the court that the
probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts
and circumstances, substantially outweighs its prejudicial
effect.
It is intended that convictions over 10 years old will be
admitted very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances.
The rules provide that the decision be supported by specific
facts and circumstances thus requiring the court to make
specific findings on the record as to the particular facts and
circumstances it has considered in determining that the pro-
bative value of the conviction substantially outweighs its pre-
judicial impact .... 12
, See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States
District Courts and Magistrates, supra note 45, at 296.
52 S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974).
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C. Alteration in the Admonition Rule
When a prior criminal conviction is introduced into evi-
dence to impeach an accused, there exists an obvious risk that
the jury will use the evidence for other than impeachment pur-
poses. To minimize this risk, jurors are instructed by the trial
judge as to how they should and should not use the evidence.
A failure of the court to provide such an instruction, after a
request by an accused, constitutes reversible error.
Not infrequently a criminal defendant will anticipate an
impeachment effort by the prosecution, and on his own inform
the jury that he has previously been convicted of a felony
offense. In a case decided in 1967, Shockley v. Common-
wealth, 3 the Court of Appeals ruled that a defendant who
so anticipates an impeachment of his character loses the
right to have the jury instructed to use the evidence only for
purposes of credibility. A strong dissent was filed in that case
on the ground that the majority's position authorized the jury
in effect "to consider the prior conviction for any and all pur-
poses, including the probability of guilt and the length of sen-
tence to be imposed." 4 During its most recent term the Su-
preme Court retreated from this position and adopted the fol-
lowing rule:
Since [Shockley v. Commonwealth], the principles
applicable to the reception of prior felony convictions were
reconsidered and restated in Cotton v. Commonwealth...
wherein it was made clear that the fact of such a conviction
should never be considered by the jury as substantive evi-
dence tending to enhance the likelihood of his being guilty of
the charge or charges presently being tried, and that the only
way to protect against its being so considered is to admonish
the jury to that effect. Unless he waives it by failure to re-
quest it, the defendant is entitled to the admonition and a
failure to give it is reversible error. To the extent that it holds
otherwise, Shockley may be considered overruled.55
415 S.W.2d 866 (Ky. 1967).
Id. at 873.
Romans v. Commonwealth, 547 S.W.2d 128 (Ky. 1977).
[Vol. 66
